The new game: America’s dominance is being challenged
A continent separates the blood-soaked battlefields of Syria from the reefs and shoals that litter the South China Sea. In their different ways, however, both places are witnessing the most significant shift in great-power relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Ali Khedery:
Although Maliki achieved many successes during his first term, which coincided with Bush’s surge, his second, from 2010 to 2014, was catastrophic. Violence rose from the post-2003 lows to new heights. Entire divisions of the Iraqi army melted away in the face of vastly smaller forces, leaving billions of dollars’ worth of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition behind for use by terrorists. The entirety of Iraq’s Sunni heartland fell to the Islamic State. Baghdad’s relations with Iraqi Kurdi-stan and the Sunni provinces collapsed, and the central government lost control over more than half its territory. The Iranian-backed Shiite militias that Maliki had once crushed rebounded so ferociously in the face of the Islamic State’s assaults that they now likely outnumber the official Iraqi security forces. Most damning, both the Islamic State and the Shiite militias now wield advanced U.S. military hardware as they commit atrocities throughout Iraq.
Across much of the Middle East today, a sad truth prevails: decades of bad governance have caused richly diverse societies to fracture along ethno-sectarian lines. In Iraq, it is now evident that Shiite Islamists will not accept secular-nationalist rule by Sunnis or Shiites and that neither camp will accept rule by Sunni Islamists, especially the radical version espoused by the Islamic State. The relatively secular Kurds, meanwhile, are unwilling to live under Arab rule of any sort. In short, these powerful groups’ visions of life, religion, and politics are fundamentally incompatible. As for the minority Christian, Shabak, Yazidi, Sabean Mandaean, and Jewish communities that once numbered in the millions and occupied Mesopotamia for millennia, they have faced the Hobbesian fate of violent death or permanent displacement.
The utter and complete collapse of governance in Iraq cannot be understated. Power vacuums produce few tangible benefits in the near term, and as is evident today, far more disastrous consequences in the long-run. Managing a post-vacuum state can address many of the long term ills, but why create one in the first place? Khedery again:
There is no question now that George W. Bush waged a poorly conceived and poorly executed war. There is also no question now that Obama precipitously and irresponsibly disengaged from Iraq after backing a divisive leader in Maliki. Washington’s Iraq policy failures have transcended administrations and parties. But the next president has a chance to do better. … It is far more likely, however, that Iraq will continue its current slide and its government will keep failing to fulfill its basic obligations to deliver security and services. In that case, the next U.S. president should act decisively to prevent Iraq from degenerating into a second Syria, a zombie state terrorizing its citizens, exporting millions of refugees, and incubating jihad. This would mean openly encouraging confederal decentralization across Iraq and Syria—devolving powers from Baghdad and Damascus to the provinces while maintaining the two countries’ territorial integrity. In extreme circumstances, Washington might resort to embracing Balkan-style partition and a new regional political order.
The continuity of US foreign policy suggests engagement with Iraq will not break from the previous decades of policy, whether that’s supporting problematic political rulers or simply horrendous shortsightedness. Though Khedery’s suggestion of “Balkanizing” Iraq and Syria makes for an interesting thought experiment, it is far from being reasonable. The continuity of US foreign policy also means the entire aparatus prefers things to remain as status quo as possible (even if the status quo leads to disaster). The past decade of instability in Iraq can be traced directly to the 2003 invasion and preceding administration’s poor military strategies, but there is also a direct line to the Colonial break-up of the Levant. Ill-conceived foreign policies only exacerbate the problems of a border structure that were drawn between two 20th century diplomates. Creating nation-states out of an amalgamation of ethnic and religious groups creates inorganic social structures and thus governance systems that have little regard for the governed or any ability to govern.
